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Economic models suggest that firms use a simple cost-benefit calculation to evaluate customer
requests for new product features, but an extensive organizational literature shows the decision
to implement innovation is more nuanced. We address this theoretical tension by studying how
firms respond to customer requests for incremental product innovations, and how these responses
change when the requested innovation is complex. Using large sample empirical analyses
combined with detailed qualitative data drawn from interviews, we find considerable variance
in the relationship between customer demands, complexity, and investments in incremental
innovations. The qualitative study revealed the importance of organization structures, competitive
pressures, and incentives for resource allocation processes. Copyright  2011 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The management literature largely assumes that
firms prioritize customer demands, and yet oper-
ating a customer-focused firm is more often the
exception than the norm. A survey of Amazon.com
produces 9,000 books about improving customer-
focus in firms, suggesting that a customer-focus
is both desirable and difficult to implement. The
classical academic canon supporting a customer-
focus argues that customers spur firms to invest
in innovation and channel that investment in par-
ticular directions (Schmookler, 1966). Subsequent
research explores the boundaries of customers’
impact on innovation, finding, for example, that
firms are less likely to prioritize customer demands
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during radical innovation for fear of cannibalizing
existing products (Tushman and Anderson, 1986);
that specialized communication routines within
an organization can impede customer-focus dur-
ing architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark,
1990); and that a myopic focus on current cus-
tomers can undermine meeting future customer
needs (Christensen, 1997). Despite these bound-
aries, most innovation literature continues to assert
that demand driven innovation (DDI) (Reinganum,
1985) will predict a firm’s incremental inno-
vation efforts. This assumption runs counter to
the literature on the microfoundations of decision
making, which argues that organizational decision
making processes condition a firm’s investment
decisions (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1994). Cus-
tomer requests filtered through a firm’s decision-
making structure may not survive, and those that
do may be accorded a lower priority than other firm
goals. Reconciling this apparent contradiction—
between the theoretical canon on customer-focused
Copyright  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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innovation and the empirical literature on the
microfoundations of organizational decision mak-
ing—is the focus of this paper.
The literature on the individual and organiza-
tional processes affecting investment in innova-
tion is large and crosses several disciplines. Some
study individual-level effects, such as manage-
rial risk aversion (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993),
choice bracketing (Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin,
1999), and escalation or de-escalation of com-
mitment (Noda and Bower, 1996). Others con-
sider organization-level effects, such as product
complexity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), organiza-
tion structures (Argyres, 1996; Gilbert, 2006), and
organizational incentives (Henderson and Cock-
burn, 1994). The innovation impact of product
complexity, in particular, presents an interesting
theoretical tension. On the one hand, complex
designs improve product integration and prod-
uct performance (Ulrich and Eppinger, 1999). On
the other hand, product complexity can under-
mine intermediate innovation outcomes, including
product upgradability (Garud and Kumaraswamy,
1995), maintenance costs (Banker, Davis, and
Slaughter, 1998), ease of outsourcing (Schilling
and Steensma, 2001), and design and development
time (Ulrich, 1995). This suggests that firms pro-
ducing complex products must trade off between
optimizing the performance of current products
and pursuing incremental innovations to maintain
and improve products for future sales. If cus-
tomers value current product performance and the
incremental innovation of new features, product
complexity has the unusual theoretical property
of affecting customer needs both positively and
negatively. Even an organization that advocates
customer primacy and strives to meet each need
(Christensen and Bower, 1996) will sometimes be
forced to fulfill one customer’s need ahead of (or
instead of) another’s. The potential for conflict
increases as products become more complex.
Our central assertion is that complexity cre-
ates organizational constraints that will alter firms’
incentive to be customer-focused, for two reasons.
First, changing a complex product creates a cas-
cade of impacts across interdependent units of the
firm (Ulrich, 1995). This cascade reduces the like-
lihood a firm will invest in innovation, especially
when changes are hard for engineers to anticipate
and coordinate ex ante. Prior research suggests that
individuals struggle to integrate information across
multiple subsets (Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1989).
Decision makers who seek a common denomi-
nator between subsets will still struggle to make
choices because individuals often find it difficult
to compare across conceptual categories (Thaler,
1985). Firms may be similarly reluctant to pur-
sue complex innovations because (1) information
is more difficult to integrate across firm units, and
because (2) proposed projects without integrated
information will appear more risky to decision
makers (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Thaler,
1999).
The second reason complexity creates organi-
zational constraints on incremental innovation is
that complexity has path-dependent effects over
time. Complex products entail a large number of
interdependencies between firm units. Knowledge
about interdependencies becomes embedded and
obscured over time in firm routines dictating what
must (or must not) be done to produce a product
(MacDuffie, 1997). Failing to recognize a prod-
uct’s underlying interdependencies makes it more
difficult to effect change when change is needed.
For example, Winter and Szulanski’s (2001: 739)
study of Banc One’s acquisition process showed
that, while a template used to convert acquired
banks to Banc One’s methods was mostly suc-
cessful, the firm was forced to reinvent it several
times because its components were tacit and poorly
documented; when someone critical to the con-
version left the firm, knowledge of various inter-
dependencies left with them. Other research has
found that knowledge about underlying interdepen-
dencies becomes more tacit as products become
more complex (Cusumano and Selby, 1998). An
increase in tacit knowledge makes it difficult for
firms to accurately calculate the benefits and costs
of an innovation—a step that is central to the DDI
model.
This study examines how firms prioritize cus-
tomer requests for incremental innovation by com-
bining large sample empirical analyses with
detailed qualitative data from interviews. We first
test our hypotheses using a panel dataset of incre-
mental innovation decisions made by a single firm
in the test and measurement instruments industry.
This firm produces and sells a Bluetooth proto-
col analyzer and makes periodic upgrades to its
product in the form of software and hardware
changes. Each time the firm considered investing
in an innovation requested by a customer, we col-
lected data about two phases of decision making:
(1) the decision to innovate (or not) in response to
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a customer request; and, (2) the method of imple-
mentation—standardization or customization. We
supplemented the econometric results with in-depth
interviews of the managers and engineers involved
in implementing a customer request. Taken
together, our results document how the compli-
cated interactions of individual motivations and
organizational constraints respond to product com-
plexity—and systematically undermine a firm’s
incentive for prioritizing customer requests.
Our principal theoretical contributions are
twofold. Our results confirm that complexity has a
significant impact on software change decisions, as
argued in the existing complexity literature. Inno-
vating firms are buffeted by macroeconomic uncer-
tainties, technological changes, forces of industry
structure, and internal organizational constraints,
among other forces. Efforts to be customer-
focused, as with all managerial decisions, require
firms to make trade-offs. Changing products to
meet customer requests is especially difficult when
products are complex because changes requires
buy-in and technological innovation from man-
agers in multiple areas of the firm. Within the
complicated process of organization decision mak-
ing, customer priorities may be diluted or lost
entirely.
Our second theoretical contribution is to the
innovation literature. Much of the extant liter-
ature advocates for the power of incentives or
for the primacy of organizational sources (see
Henderson, 1993 for an important exception).
We adopt a behavioral view of decision mak-
ing to assert that firm processes for decision
making are critical to understanding the motives
and objectives in play. We observe that even
customer innovation requests with demonstrated
market demand (or lack of demand) are not uni-
versally embraced (or rejected). This suggests that
organizational decision-making processes—rather
than market incentives alone—are a critical com-
ponent of the decisions firms make. We aim to
enhance our understanding of firm innovation deci-
sions by exploring why firms sometimes pro-
duce decisions that are consistent with the DDI
model and other times produce decisions shaped
by organizational constraints, including product
complexity.
The following section outlines prior research on
investment in incremental innovation and sets up
the principal hypotheses we examine empirically.
INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION
Systematic research interest in innovation was
sparked by Schumpeter (1934), who argued that
innovations in the economy—defined as creating
new combinations to generate an economic sur-
plus—came from small entrepreneurial firms. In
later work, Schumpeter reversed course and argued
that large organizations drove innovation (Schum-
peter, 1950). Today, his theories of innovation fuel
inquiry into both the importance of firm resources
and endowments and the role of firm decision-
making processes.
The DDI Model
Theories based on market demand attribute inno-
vation to the profit motive or the power of incen-
tives. The DDI model, specifically, contends that
innovation and technological change respond to
customer demand (Schmookler, 1966). Customer
demand is a function of customer preferences.
As customers’ tastes, income levels, and budget
constraints change, so do their preferences. Pref-
erence changes will shift the demand curve and
promote technological change and innovation. In
essence, then, the DDI model argues that changes
in demand trigger changes in estimates of market
size, which affect a firm’s incentive to innovate.
This assumes that expectations about market size
are positively correlated with profitability, such
that customer needs alter market size, and market
size alters investment in innovation (Acemoglu and
Linn, 2004). The mechanism linking market size
to investment in innovation is profitability.
The original formulation of the DDI model
applied to all forms of innovation, but subsequent
research suggests that market incentives will be
muted when an innovation cannibalizes the exist-
ing market for the incumbent (Arrow, 1962), when
the competence required to invest in the innova-
tion is different from what the incumbent firm
possesses (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and
when the innovation alters the product’s architec-
ture (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The explana-
tory power of the DDI model is still presumed
to be robust in the case of incremental innova-
tion—defined as an innovation that preserves the
market for the existing product (Arrow, 1962).
This is because both the economic logic, based on
incentives, and the organizational logic, based on
inertia, converge to reinforce the dominance of an
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incumbent firm engaging in incremental innovation
(see Henderson, 1993). In related work, Chris-
tensen and Bower (1996) show that in the wake
of a disruptive innovation (i.e., the emergence of
new market needs), incumbent firms failed because
their organizational processes were designed to
satisfy existing customers. Thus, even organiza-
tional theories supporting the role of organiza-
tional inertia argue that customer demand will spur
investment in incremental innovation. The de facto
hypothesis becomes:
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, customer demand
for an incremental innovation increases the like-
lihood a firm will invest in that innovation.
Complexity and the likelihood of investing in
innovation
The implications of complexity have been explored
in a variety of business decisions, including inno-
vation (Ethiraj, 2007), product design (Ulrich,
1995), industry structure (Baldwin and Clark,
2000), and make-or-buy (Langlois and Everett,
1992). With respect to the impact of complexity
on innovation, several studies document a posi-
tive relationship between complexity and incre-
mental innovation, measured in either person hours
(Banker et al., 1998; Subramanian, Pendharkar,
and Wallace, 2006) or the frequency of main-
tenance work (Kemerer and Slaughter, 1997).
In effect, these studies found that complexity
increased the time and effort required to innovate.
Banker et al. (1993) used regression estimates of
person hours to estimate the cost function of soft-
ware maintenance and concluded that complexity
poses significant dollar costs.1 These findings are
consistent with the DDI model in that a firm’s
profitability calculus should include the cost of
complexity, but complexity alone should have no
independent effect on the decision to innovate.
The reason complexity might, in fact, have an
independent effect on the decision to innovate
is that complexity is known to affect individual
behaviors. For instance, Chan (2000) found that
increasing complexity also increased the lead time
needed to meet maintenance needs. This suggests
that complexity might create behavioral aversion
1 The caveat, however, is that several prior studies have found
inconsistent relationships between dollar costs of maintenance
and complexity (see Banker et al., 1993 for a review of the
prior literature).
among engineers, resulting in delayed attention to
tasks. In a related vein, den Besten, Dalle, and
Galia (2008) examined the impact of complexity
on the degree of collaboration among engineers
across a variety of open source projects. They
found that higher program complexity reduced par-
ticipation rates, confirming that complexity might
have significant behavioral effects. What is not
clear is whether participation falls because
(1) complex products have higher interdependen-
cies between modules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000)
and are difficult to coordinate simultaneously,
or because (2) complexity increases coordination
demands on programmers that cannot be managed
easily in an open source development environment.
What is clear is that complexity changes the cost
of innovation and has subtle but important behav-
ioral effects. Do those behavioral effects change
the likelihood that a firm will engage in incremen-
tal innovation? If they do, complexity’s ex ante
behavioral effects may be more relevant than its
ex post cost implications. If nothing else, explor-
ing the behavioral effects of complexity, and their
bearing on firm investments in incremental inno-
vation, introduces an important source of hetero-
geneity to the study of decision making within and
across firms.
At the organization level, prior theory suggests
that complexity has at least one important effect on
the likelihood of investing in innovation. Increas-
ing interdependencies among various elements of
a product makes it more difficult to engage in
product innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
In exploring why complexity affects maintenance
effort, Banker et al. (1998) present complexity
as a function of the number of information cues
a firm must process, the strength of interdepen-
dencies among those information cues, and the
changes in the relationships among these informa-
tion cues over time. These facets of complexity
increase managers’ cognitive burdens by obscuring
their perception and understanding of information
cues. These effects will become stronger over time
as knowledge about interdependencies becomes
embedded in organizational routines (Lippman and
Rumelt, 1982), and as product designers leave
the firm without documenting product decisions
and the interdependencies those decisions cre-
ated (Winter and Szulanski, 2001). Ultimately, a
poor understanding of a product’s underlying inter-
dependencies will vastly increase the cognitive
effort required to engage in design changes—an
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effect that has been shown empirically in the
study of other organizational outcomes (Novak and
Eppinger, 2001; Nutt, 1998; Simonin, 1999).
As interdependence among the elements of a
product increases, making improvements to one
part may cause significant disruptions for other
parts. For example, the open source Internet
browser Firefox was developed by a core group
of 12 full-time programmers of the Mozilla foun-
dation with the assistance of about 80 code con-
tributors worldwide (Lohr and Markoff, 2004).
Firefox is a completely redesigned and rewritten
Web browser that, according to anecdotal evi-
dence, overcomes many of the security vulnera-
bilities of Microsoft Internet Explorer in a more
compact package while also offering new features
such as tabbed browsing and pop-up blockers.
This propelled Firefox to a five percent market
share within a few months (Stross, 2004), while
Microsoft struggled to add new features to Inter-
net Explorer. The following quotes suggest that
Microsoft’s innovation efforts were undermined by
an increase in interdependence:
The incipient rise of Firefox, some analysts
say, points to an inherent weakness in a fun-
damental Microsoft business strategy: tying
more and more products and features to its
monopoly product, the Windows operating
system. Internet explorer is tightly bound
to Windows, a move that Microsoft says
improves the browser’s performance.
This strategy, the analysts say, means that inno-
vation in much of the company’s software tends
to move in lockstep with Windows development,
and that pace has slowed as the operating sys-
tem has become larger and increasingly complex
(Lohr and Markoff, 2004: C4, emphasis added).
And
[T]abs are what hooked me, he [Microsoft’s
director of product management for Win-
dows, Gary Schare] told me, referring to
the ability to open within a single window
many different Web sites and move easily
among them, rather than open separate win-
dows for each one and tax the computer’s
memory. Firefox has tabs. Other browsers
do, too. But fundamental design decisions
for Internet Explorer prevent the addition of
this and other desiderata without a thorough
update of Windows, which will not be com-
plete until 2006 at the earliest (Stross, 2004:
3.5, emphasis added).
Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: A firm will be less likely to invest
in incremental innovation when a product is
more complex.
The complexity of change (‘change complex-
ity’) also has an impact on innovation invest-
ment. At the individual level, innovations that
are complex—ones that span multiple elements
of the product—create a unique set of behavioral
challenges. Prior research suggests that individu-
als find it difficult to integrate information across
diverse sources because it is difficult to make
information comparable across distinct categories
(Dawes et al., 1989; Thaler, 1985). Projects with-
out aggregated information will appear to be more
risky and thus affect investment decisions. Thaler
(2000) conducted an experiment with executives
and found that business unit heads were more
reluctant than CEOs (chief executive officers) to
invest in risky projects because CEOs were privy
to information about all projects and were bet-
ter able to estimate aggregate risks. In addition,
cost estimates for complex projects may be inflated
because it is hard to estimate the individual efforts
required for interdependent tasks (Kahneman and
Lovallo, 1993).2 As a result, individuals are less
likely to advocate and pursue innovations that are
complex.
At the organization level, incremental innova-
tions spanning multiple product modules are less
likely to be pursued because they are less likely
to be successful, in part because they demand
greater coordination among development teams.
Henderson and Clark (1990) found that incum-
bent firms are less likely to invest in architectural
innovation—innovations that span multiple prod-
uct modules—because organizational communi-
cation routines and filters are customized to an
existing product. Innovations that span multiple
product modules require a deep understanding and
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possi-
bility. Indeed this was empirically supported in the data (see
Figure 2).
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communication of the underlying interdependen-
cies among organization teams. Knowledge that
has not been codified impedes effective innova-
tion even if that knowledge resides somewhere
within the organization (Szulanski, 1996). Hansen
(1999) confirmed the increased coordination bur-
den associated with complexity when he found that
complex knowledge cannot be transferred with-
out strong ties between individuals. By implica-
tion, implementing innovations that span multiple
product modules will demand strong ties between
product teams. When strong ties do not exist, inno-
vating across modules becomes less likely.
Given the role of organization structures in mit-
igating complexity, a key question is whether
strong ties are likely to exist between product
teams. When product teams are predicated on the
logic of autonomy and independence, their man-
date is to pursue innovations within the bounds
of the responsibility assigned to them. Auton-
omy reduces the possibility of cross-team inno-
vation initiatives, but it also mitigates the cost of
repeated and ongoing coordination, which would
be required to manage tightly interdependent
teams. Organization structures in software firms
specifically, are often designed explicitly to max-
imize autonomy and limit reciprocal interdepen-
dencies, such that product teams have weak ties
by design (Cusumano and Selby, 1998; Thompson,
1967). This will create a strong incentive to pur-
sue innovations that lie within each team’s purview
and to ignore innovations that span multiple teams.
Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2b: A firm will be less likely to
invest in incremental innovation when a pro-
posed change is more complex.
In sum, the central assertion of this paper is
that product complexity and change complexity
can constrain investment in incremental innova-
tion. The following section describes the setting in
which we test our hypotheses.
BLUETOOTH PROTOCOL ANALYZER
The product we study here is a ‘Bluetooth proto-
col analyzer.’ Bluetooth is a short-range wireless
communication standard that allows connectiv-
ity between electronic equipment using frequen-
cies in the 2.45 GHz range. Bluetooth-enabled
devices communicate with each other using low-
powered signals and a language of commands and
responses, known as protocols, specified in the
Bluetooth Standard. Individual Bluetooth devices
can be wirelessly connected to each other to form a
‘personal area network’ of electronic devices. For
example, a personal area network could consist of
a Bluetooth-enabled mobile phone and a wireless
headset.
The Bluetooth protocol analyzer is used to test
and measure Bluetooth signals during the produc-
tion of Bluetooth consumer products. Thus, typical
customers of the Bluetooth protocol analyzer are
not end-users themselves but the firms producing
Bluetooth-enabled consumer products. Firms pro-
ducing Bluetooth-enabled devices need to test the
interoperability of their devices with others that
could be used in the end-consumer’s personal area
network.
The Bluetooth protocol analyzer includes a hard-
ware component and a software component. The
hardware component includes an air-sniffing probe
to intercept wireless communication traffic
between Bluetooth devices, a cable-sniffing inter-
face to intercept wired communication traffic, and
a serial and parallel port interface for connection
with a personal computer (PC). The software com-
ponent involves firmware stored in the memory of
the hardware component and a packaged software
product for installation on the client’s PC. The
physical hardware and the firmware stored in the
protocol analyzer intercept data moving between
Bluetooth devices and pass it to the client soft-
ware package for further analysis. Captured data
is mapped to the typical levels recommended by
the Bluetooth standard and subjected to statisti-
cal quality analysis. The software package helps
define the specifications and configures Bluetooth
devices used in the testing procedure, controls the
data sources, represents results in a graphical man-
ner, and prepares testing reports.
Evolution of the Bluetooth protocol analyzer
We examine the evolution of client software for
protocol analyzers to understand the impact of
customer demand and complexity on the decision
to innovate. The evolution of protocol analyzer
software depends on two categories of actions:
changes that are involuntary and changes that are
voluntary.
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Involuntary changes in protocol analyzer soft-
ware are triggered by one or several of three
sources. First, changes in Bluetooth standards trig-
ger changes in hardware, software, or both. The
Bluetooth standard is governed by a Bluetooth spe-
cial interest group of more than 1,000 electronic
equipment manufacturers. Changes to the Blue-
tooth standard must be incorporated in the next
release of a protocol analyzer, so changes in stan-
dards almost always necessitate changes to pro-
tocol analyzer client software. Second, hardware
component changes can trigger software changes.
Protocol analyzer hardware includes semiconduc-
tor components. When design and process
improvements in the semiconductor industry allow
allied industries to reduce hardware costs, the pro-
tocol analyzer industry sometimes updates its hard-
ware, firmware, and client software to exploit those
cost reductions. Finally, changes to the operating
system (OS) software on which the client software
runs will necessitate changes to protocol analyzer
software. The Bluetooth protocol analyzer pack-
aged software component is designed to run on the
Windows and Solaris operating systems. The Blue-
tooth protocol analyzer software component inter-
acts with the OS using application programming
interfaces (APIs). As newer operating systems are
released, the APIs they support are upgraded and
the protocol analyzer software must be modified.
Involuntary changes are not the focus of this study,
but we do control for such triggers.
Voluntary changes in protocol analyzer
software
Studying voluntary changes to the protocol ana-
lyzer software allows us to observe the managerial
decisions those changes reflect. Protocol analyzers
are essential equipment for consumer electronics
manufacturers. As firms build consumer products
based on evolving Bluetooth standards, they need
reliable equipment to test the basic functioning
and interoperability of their products. Often, the
diagnostic data required by different firms may
be different. Consequently, the standardized pro-
tocol analyzer client software usually meets only
the most common needs. When firms encounter
specific needs that are not implemented in the
software, they initiate a request to the protocol
analyzer manufacturer to incorporate the feature
they want. Customer requests for new product
features allow us to examine the circumstances
under which firms implement incremental innova-
tions to their software (von Hippel, 1976). Meet-
ing requests may require changes in hardware,
changes in firmware, and/or changes in client soft-
ware. There is a discretionary and irreversible
research and development (R&D) cost associated
with meeting each request. Thus, in the decision
to meet a customer request we can measure the
cost and benefit of fulfillment. Requests that are
fulfilled may be implemented with a customized
delivery to the client making the request or by
incorporating the change into the software’s next
release.
This context allows us to measure and track
the evolution of the software product and also to
observe discrete decisions about product enhance-
ments over time. These decisions may be con-
sistent with a cost-benefit calculus (i.e., DDI) or
they may systematically deviate from it. Varia-
tions along the cost-benefit dimension, coupled
with variations in request fulfillment, allow us to
tease out the impact of complexity on the decision
to innovate.
The context of protocol analyzer software is
also attractive because it allows us to control
for, or rule out, several competing explanations.
First, there is not much uncertainty about the
cost-benefit calculus. It has been well documented
that the total lifetime cost of maintaining a soft-
ware program is 40 percent or more of the cost
of developing it, and that fixing a defect has
a 20–50 percent chance of introducing another
defect (Brooks, 1995: 121–122). Other studies
show that while the number of modules increased
linearly with every incremental release of IBM’s
OS/360 (a large operating system to run a main-
frame computer), the number of software modules
modified increased exponentially with each release
(Krishnan, Mukhopadhyay, and Kriebel, 2004).
Thus, unlike, for example, the disk-drive industry
(Christensen and Bower, 1996), uncertainty about
performance trajectories relative to costs is not a
significant concern for protocol analyzer software.
Second, while there is evidence of learning
curves in software development, the relevant learn-
ing in our setting is at the level of the individual.
Prior research has shown that software productiv-
ity has strong individual-level effects (Fong Boh,
Slaughter, and Espinosa, 2007). Learning can be an
important alternative explanation if a firm acquires
a new software product and staffs a new devel-
opment team to work on it. This is not the case
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in our empirical setting. The firm featured in our
research developed its product from scratch and
performed in-house maintenance throughout the
versions we study. Thus, large-scale changes in
maintenance personnel did not occur. In addition,
the presence of public and open standards in the
Bluetooth product removes a large source of firm-
specific knowledge that is typically acquired in
learning-by-doing.
Finally, the Bluetooth protocol analyzer is a
standalone product whose only complement is the
computer on which the client software runs (typi-
cally Unix and Windows). Since changes to the OS
have been less frequent than changes to the proto-
col analyzer software, we are less concerned about
the effect of complementarities as an alternative
explanation (Schilling, 2003). We do control for
the size of the installed base of protocol analyzer
software.
LARGE SAMPLE STUDY
Sample and data
We collected data from a leading test and mea-
surement firm that, in 2004, operated in 20 coun-
tries, recorded over $1.5 billion in sales, and held
675 active technology patents. Using data from
one firm severely limits the generalizability of the
study, but the rich data presented here is difficult
(if not impossible) to obtain across a wider set of
firms. Moreover, using data from a single firm is
not unique to this paper. There is a long history
in the management journals of publishing papers
with single firm data, be they case studies (Doz,
1996; Marginson, 2002) or large sample disaggre-
gated data from a single firm (see e.g., Dencker,
2009; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Huckman, Staats, and
Upton, 2009; Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen, 2000;
Ton and Huckman, 2008).
Because we cannot identify the firm for con-
fidentiality reasons, we refer to it here as ‘Mea-
suretronics.’ Measuretronics invests about one
third of its revenues in R&D across five busi-
nesses, including oscilloscopes, logic analyzers,
video test products, telecommunications equip-
ment, and optical sensor products. The firm has
about 400 customers in various industries, includ-
ing silicon vendors, electronic standards
compliance testers, communication protocol stack
developers, communication equipment manufac-
turers, and telecommunication application devel-
opers. Figure 1 presents Measuretronics’s organi-
zation chart.
The protocol analyzer client software spanned
a life cycle of 28 versions in a five-year period.
CEO and president
Board of directors (CEO + eight external members)
Sr. vice president - corporate
development Vice president - worldwide
manufacturing
Vice president - human
resources
Sr. vice president and general
manager - communications
business
Sr. vice president and general
manager - instrument business
Sr. vice president and chief
financial officer
Vice president - logic
analyzer
Vice president - video
product
Vice president - signal
Sources 
Vice president -
spectrum analyzer
Vice president -
oscilloscopes
Country administration
managers
Sr. vice president - service
General manager - support
General manager - sales
and marketing
Product line engineering
managers
Engineering teams
Manufacturing teams
Sales and marketing teams
Technical support teams
Figure 1. Measuretronics organization chart
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The data collection for this project covered all 28
versions and involved an in-depth exploration of
the functional features and complexity of the prod-
uct and the firm’s product development process. It
included interviews with product managers, pro-
gram developers, customers, and Bluetooth domain
experts. In all, the efforts required to gather the
data took three years.
Decisions to implement incremental innovations
in protocol analyzer software at Measuretronics
involved three major steps. The first step involved
collection and consolidation of customer requests.
The firm uses an online system called ‘customer
support network’ to log all customer requests and
feedback, and each request is assigned a unique
ticket number. The second step is a thorough anal-
ysis of the feature request tickets. This involves
removing duplicate tickets, grouping tickets from
different customers that have similar content, and
validating the content of each customer ticket. Dur-
ing the validation process, a product management
specialist checks if the requested feature is already
present in the released product versions. If the
requested feature is not available in the current
product, the ticket is scheduled for further action.
In the last step of the innovation decision pro-
cess, the product management team works with the
development team to analyze the technical feasi-
bility of a change request, checks if the requested
feature is shipped by a competitor, and generates a
customer survey. The customer survey is designed
to obtain installed-base feedback on the proposed
feature. A survey e-mailed to existing customers
of the Bluetooth protocol analyzer solicits feed-
back on the proposed feature (or change). To
discourage casual feedback or nonresponse, cus-
tomers are also informed of the impact of the pro-
posed change in terms of code modifications and
future service-pack installations. When the opin-
ions of the installed base have been consolidated,
the firm makes a final decision to fulfill or reject
the requested feature (or change).
When we completed our data collection, 203
customer-generated product requests had been sub-
mitted. We filtered duplicate requests with assis-
tance from the product management team at the
research site, resulting in 152 unique customer
requests. Of those, 120 (79%) customer requests
were fulfilled (or completely processed) and 32
(21%) were not fulfilled. The important issue
for this study is whether the customer requests
required incremental innovation. Our analysis
indicated that a bulk of the customer requests
qualified as incremental innovations because they
entailed feature requests. A few were requests for
bug fixes, which we did not count as incremen-
tal innovation because they indicate the failure
of promised features. Table 1 provides a sample
of customer requests categorized into incremen-
tal innovations and bug fixes, respectively. We
included all customer requests in our analyses in
order not to bias the sample, and controlled for
bug-fix-type requests in the empirical analysis.
The 120 fulfilled requests were separated into
two groups: those that were integrated into the next
packaged release (92), and those that were pur-
sued as customization projects through contractual
relationships with the customer (28).
MEASURES
Dependent variables
We examine whether complexity affects incremen-
tal innovation decisions, which entails measur-
ing incremental innovation. The empirical litera-
ture measuring incremental innovation has adopted
two distinct approaches summarized here as input-
side or output-side. Input-side measures track the
expenditure on innovations such as R&D dollars or
patents (e.g., Schmookler, 1966). Output-side mea-
sures track the surplus associated with the creation
of new combinations (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990). In
this study, we employ two proxies for incremen-
tal innovation that are consistent with output-side
measures. Note that all of these innovations were
incremental in that they involved changes to an
existing product. A radical innovation, in contrast,
involves an entirely new product, which in the con-
text of software would be a new code base (Hen-
derson, 1993). Our two innovation measures are:
Fulfilled. Coded 1 if the feature requested by the
customer was fulfilled, and 0 otherwise. This mea-
sure fulfills the criteria from Schumpeter (1934) in
that any feature added to the existing product is
clearly a new combination.
Standardized. A fulfilled request was either stan-
dardized into the next release or customized for
the customer making the request. This indicator
variable is coded as 1 if the customer request
was standardized, and 0 otherwise. This mea-
sure reflects an output-side measure because a
new combination has been implemented. While
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Table 1. Classification of customer requests
Change request Nature of
request
The application should support standard Windows XP UI conventions and keyboard shortcuts Bug fix
The application should support printing (similar to MS Office applications) Bug fix
The application may provide ‘TIP OF THE DAY’ whenever it is started, similar to Microsoft Visual
Studio
Bug fix
The application shall support hiding of columns based on right mouse click on the column header Bug fix
Add/remove Bookmark option shall enable the user to toggle the bookmark on or off in the leftmost
column in the Packet List window for the row highlighted
Bug fix
File/Open dialog shall support viewing of file comments of the selected file in the comment field.
The user will not be able to edit the comment field
Bug fix
When ‘start capture’ button is pressed, it should turn to green color Bug fix
Error packet generator should allow users to delete all error sequences Bug fix
Toggle Hex-ASCII in Payload window shall allow the user to switch the display of the payload data
for the highlighted packet in the Packet Analyzer grid window between the hexadecimal format
and the ASCII format
Feature
The application should be a Windows Multi-Document Interface application (i.e., be able to display
multiple windows from application at same time with each view having its own menus and
sub-menus allowing users to switch between the different windows)
Feature
The application should support new packet-level displays including Higher Level Data Link Control
(HDLC), and Point-to-Point protocol (PPP)
Feature
The application should support search capability (text search). This should allow the user to find
specific packet types, protocol messages, and connected hosts
Feature
The application should provide a new synchronization wizard to help users connect between their
devices listed in user profiles automatically, showing connection status, and any errors to user at
start-up
Feature
The application may support page references for the standards specifications. i.e., if the user clicks
on an element on the info panel, the application may inform about the page in the Bluetooth
specification corresponding to that element or show the Bluetooth specifications information in the
online help
Feature
Users should be able to extract ‘voice data’ packets from the log files created Feature
The application should provide profile support for hands’ free profile, headset profile,
synchronization, and basic printing
Feature
The application should provide a drift-compensator that allows calculation of the unit drift necessary
for synchronization of FHS packets
Feature
The application should include a new test program interface and scripting language to help users to
automate their testing procedures
Feature
The application should provide a high-resolution time stamp Feature
The application should provide RF parametrics like received signal strength indicator Feature
customization only generates returns from the
customer who requested the feature, standardiza-
tion diffuses the innovation across the customer
base.
Independent variables
Demand
We employed three proxies to capture the effect
of customer demand on the cost-benefit trade-
off (i.e., profitability) inherent in any investment
decision. We sought to capture the value of the
proposed feature to both the installed base and
to the customer that made the request. Together,
the two proxies approximate the expected revenues
from implementing the feature. We used a third
proxy—estimated cost—to capture the expected
cost of implementing the feature.
Installed-base value
For every change request received, the firm sends
a survey to all existing customers of the prod-
uct. They are asked to indicate whether the pro-
posed feature will be useful to them. We measured
installed-base value for the proposed feature as the
percentage of customers who indicated a new fea-
ture would be useful. This variable ranges from
0–100.
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Customer importance
A customer initiating a feature request is required
to indicate its importance. This variable is coded
on a Likert scale ranging from 1–5 and measures
perceived importance of the proposed feature.3
Higher values reflect greater importance to the
customer.
Estimated cost (000s)
For each request the vendor firm received, it gen-
erated an estimate of the cost of implementing the
feature. The estimate includes the direct cost of
manpower and the time required to implement the
feature and test a new version before rollout.
COMPLEXITY
We constructed two proxies to measure product
complexity at the time the request was received,
and three proxies to measure the complexity of
the requested change.
Product complexity
Interdependencies
In practice, it is extremely difficult to measure
the number of interdependencies within a software
product. Typically, however, the number of inter-
dependencies is related to software size (Jones,
2000). We collected four different measures of
software size at the time the request was received:
number of lines of code, number of functions,
3 The codes and the description of the evaluation were as follows:
1 (The change is preferred by the customer but is not essential for
day-to-day productive operations of the customer. The customer
does not intend to be a test partner for implementing the change);
2 (The change is preferred by the customer but is not essential for
day-to-day productive operations. However the customer agrees
to be a test partner for implementing the change); 3 (The change
is needed for the day-to-day operations. The customer is willing
to accept roundabout or alternate ways of implementing the
feature and does not intend to be a pilot and test partner for
the change. The customer cannot allocate resources to simulate
a production environment); 4 (The change is needed for the
day-to-day operations of the customer. The customer is NOT
willing to accept roundabout or alternate ways of implementing
the feature but can wait until the feature is released in future
versions. The customer is willing to simulate a test production
environment); and, 5 (The feature requested is essential and time
critical. The customer is willing to allocate resources for piloting.
The customer might stop using the vendor’s product if the feature
is not made available).
number of objects, and number of classes. All four
measures were highly correlated (>0.95), which
precluded using all of them. We also noticed that
the more specialized object-oriented dependency
metrics, such as coupling between objects, and
the depth of inheritance measures correlated highly
with the size measures and increased linearly with
the number of classes in the system. Hence, we
used the number of classes to estimate the level
of interdependencies in the software product. A
class represents the highest level of aggregation
in object-oriented programming and is typically
defined as a cohesive package that encapsulates
a set of variables, functions, and objects (Booch,
1994). Our results are robust to the use of any of
the four proxies for interdependence.
Product age
As the code base of software ages, it undergoes
iterations that increase its complexity. We mea-
sured product age using the version number of
the software (1–28) on the date of the customer
request. As outlined in Hypothesis 2a, we expect
product complexity to increase with the software
version number.
Change complexity
Nature of change
Measuretronics characterized the magnitude of
change required to the existing code base. A cus-
tomer request was considered a minor change
when only one module was affected, and a major
change when modifications affected two or more
modules. While changes spanning multiple mod-
ules do not necessarily span multiple organiza-
tional subunits, prior research suggests that
organization structures tend to mirror product
architectures (Henderson and Clark, 1990). This
variable is coded 1 if the change was major.
Objects modified
For the subset of customer requests that were ful-
filled, we collected data on the number of objects
that were modified. In object-oriented program-
ming, an object is a self-contained functional entity
that consists of both data and procedures to manip-
ulate the data (Booch, 1994). This variable cap-
tures the number of objects that were modified to
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implement the change request. The larger the num-
ber of objects modified, the greater the complexity
of the request. Because we have this data only for
fulfilled projects, it is included in only part of the
estimation (details follow in the next subsection).
Intermediate releases
For the subset of requests that were fulfilled,
we obtained the number of internal intermediate
releases before the change was finalized. A larger
number of intermediate releases reflect greater
change complexity.
Other controls
Standard violation
Upon receiving a customer request for a new fea-
ture, Measuretronics verifies whether the request
violates the Bluetooth protocol standard. Stan-
dard violations alone are not cause for ignor-
ing a request. However, our interviews suggested
that standard violations pose fundamental software
conflicts because they increase the number of mod-
ules impacted by a proposed change. Thus, we
employed an indicator variable coded 1 if the cus-
tomer request violated the Bluetooth protocol in
use when the request was made.
Version conflict
For every customer request received, Measuretron-
ics also assesses whether the proposed feature will
cause incompatibility with previous releases of the
product (violating backward compatibility). Imple-
menting features that violate backward compati-
bility are a function of a change to the OS or a
change in the use of APIs. Under either condition,
the likelihood of version conflict is amplified. We
created an indicator variable coded 1 if a proposed
change required changes that were incompatible
with previous public releases of the product.
Competition
A long-standing assertion in the empirical litera-
ture on innovation is the link between innovation
and market structure (see Kamien and Schwartz,
1982 for a review). We controlled for the effect
of competition on the incentive to implement cus-
tomer requests using an indicator variable coded 1
if a competitor firm offered the feature requested
by the customer.
Market share
An alternative explanation for dampened incen-
tive for innovation is externalities (David, 1985).
The disruptive effects of innovations are ampli-
fied when a firm has a larger installed base. We
sought to control for such externalities using the
vendor’s market share of the Bluetooth protocol
analyzer product category (at the time the request
was received) as a proxy.
Features bundled
We collected data on the number of features that
were bundled into a fulfilled request. We included
this control because the number of features built
into a request can affect the incentive to standard-
ize or customize request fulfillment. The greater
the number of features built into a request, the
greater the likelihood that a larger proportion of
the installed base of customers would find it useful,
thus creating an impetus for standardization.
Time constraint
We sought to measure the time gap in days
between the date the request was logged and
the scheduled release date of the next version of
the product. Software releases are often made on
predetermined schedules (Cusumano and Selby,
1998), and the time pressure to complete sched-
uled modifications increases as the next scheduled
release date approaches. This is likely to depress
the incentive to fulfill requests or to standardize
them.
ANALYSIS
We performed the analysis in two stages. In the
first stage, we estimated a binary choice model of
the likelihood of customer request fulfillment. We
included three sets of predictors—demand, com-
plexity, and other controls to account for alter-
native explanations. Thus, the first stage probit
equation was,
P(zi = 1) =
∫ βmi+δci+τwi
−∞
φ(u1)du1
= (βmi + δ&ci + τwi) (1)
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where, zi , is the fulfillment of request i generated
by customer, j , mi , is a vector of demand covari-
ates, ci , a vector of complexity covariates, wi a
vector of controls, and u1 ∼ N(0, 1), is the stan-
dardized normal variable. Since multiple requests
may be generated by the same customer, we
adjusted the estimated standard errors for the resul-
tant heteroskedasticity.
In the second stage, we estimated the likeli-
hood that a customer request would be imple-
mented using standardization (or customization).
The standardization (or customization) of a request
is observed only if the request is fulfilled. Thus,
the likelihood of standardization is given by the
following equation,
P(si = 1) = P(si = 1|zi > 0)
=
∫ ϑmi+ηci+κwi
−∞
φ(u2)du2
= (ϑmi + ηci + κwi) (2)
Because standardization, si , is observed only
when a request is fulfilled, it creates a nonzero cor-
relation between u1 and u2 in the two equations. In
this case, a simple probit estimation of Equation 2
yields biased estimates of the coefficients (Mad-
dala, 1983). To correct for this selection bias, we
estimated from Equation 1 the hazard, hi , for each
observation, as explained below.
Let xi denote a vector of all covariates included
in Equation 1 and γˆ represent a vector of corre-
sponding estimated coefficients. Then, the hazard,
hi , for each observation is,
hi =
{
φ(xiγˆ )/(xiγˆ ), zi = 1
−φ(xiγˆ )/{1 − (xiγˆ )}, zi = 0
Equation 2 was then augmented with the hazard,
h, estimated in the first stage,
P(si = 1|zi > 0) =
∫ ϑmi+ηci+κwi+ρσhi
−∞
φ(u2)du2
= (ϑmi + ηci + κwi + ρσhi)
(3)
Because the covariance of the error terms are
nonzero, Equation 3 is identified only when there
is at least one variable in Equation 3 that is not
included in Equation 1 (Maddala, 1983: 120). We
used two variables not included in Equation 1—
intermediate releases and features bundled—to
identify Equation 3. We again employed probit
estimation for Equation 3 and corrected the
estimated standard errors for heteroskedasticity
due to multiple requests from the same customer.
Large sample study results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the
correlation matrix of variables employed in the
estimation. The one caveat in interpreting the cor-
relations in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 is that
the two dependent variables, fulfilled and standard-
ized, are categorical variables. They are reported
here merely to provide an indication of the direc-
tion of the relationship. The correlation matrix,
seen from the negative signs on the correlation
coefficients of the complexity measures with the
first dependent variable (fulfilled), lends support
to the argument that complexity affects innovation
decisions.
We offered two microfoundations for our the-
ory explaining the link between complexity and
the likelihood of investing in innovation. First, at
the individual level, we argued that more complex
projects will generate higher variance in the cost
estimates, which will impede the use of the cost-
benefit calculus. We divided completed projects
into two groups based on complexity and exam-
ined the relationship between estimated completion
time (a proxy for cost) and actual completion time.
We plot this in Figure 2. We see that the cost esti-
mates for less complex projects are fairly accurate
and the confidence interval is relatively narrow. In
contrast, the costs for more complex projects are
more likely to be underestimated and, furthermore,
their confidence interval is very large. With a large
confidence interval, the use of a cost-benefit cal-
culus in decision making is prone to error. This
confirms the face validity of the theory that it is
more difficult to estimate costs for highly complex
projects.
Second, at the organization level, we argued that
product complexity increases with time. Given the
normal personnel turnover associated with R&D
teams, we predicted an increase in product com-
plexity as the knowledge behind interdependencies
becomes tacit. More tacit knowledge will weaken
the understanding of cause-effect relationships and
hamper the implementation of changes. While we
do not have a direct measure of tacit knowledge,
Copyright  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 33: 137–161 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
150 S. K. Ethiraj, N. Ramasubbu, and M.S. Krishnan
Ta
bl
e
2.
M
ea
n
s,
SD
,a
n
d
co
rr
el
at
io
n
m
at
rix
o
fv
ar
ia
bl
es
em
pl
oy
ed
in
es
tim
at
io
n
(N
=1
52
)
Va
ria
bl
e
M
ea
n
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1
Fu
lfi
lle
d
0.
77
9
0.
41
6
1.
00
2
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
0.
76
7
0.
42
5
—
1.
00
3
In
st
al
le
d-
ba
se
v
al
ue
42
.5
97
26
.9
0.
41
−0
.2
4
1.
00
4
Cu
sto
m
er
im
po
rta
nc
e
3.
94
8
0.
95
5
0.
29
0.
18
0.
45
1.
00
5
Es
tim
at
ed
co
st
(00
0s
)
24
4.
38
1
16
4.
69
2
0.
04
0.
15
0.
16
0.
30
1.
00
6
In
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
ie
s
17
0.
65
6
69
.3
85
−0
.4
1
0.
34
−0
.2
4
0.
06
0.
09
1.
00
7
St
an
da
rd
v
io
la
tio
n
0.
29
2
0.
45
6
−0
.3
1
−0
.6
7
0.
01
−0
.1
3
−0
.1
7
−0
.0
1
1.
00
8
N
at
ur
e
o
fc
ha
ng
e
0.
40
9
0.
49
3
−0
.5
6
0.
24
−0
.2
5
0.
10
0.
34
0.
39
0.
04
1.
00
9
Pr
o
du
ct
ag
e
12
.6
82
7.
80
3
−0
.5
0
0.
44
−0
.2
8
0.
01
0.
12
0.
83
0.
01
0.
44
1.
00
10
Ve
rs
io
n
co
n
fli
ct
0.
48
1
0.
50
1
−0
.2
1
−0
.2
7
−0
.2
2
−0
.2
9
−0
.1
8
0.
06
0.
37
−0
.0
7
0.
01
1.
00
11
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n
0.
45
5
0.
5
0.
24
0.
22
0.
25
0.
30
0.
19
−0
.1
6
−0
.2
9
0.
06
−0
.1
2
−0
.7
8
1.
00
12
Ti
m
e
co
n
st
ra
in
t
20
2.
55
9
17
2.
85
1
−0
.3
7
0.
35
−0
.3
0
0.
10
0.
05
0.
44
0.
05
0.
40
0.
37
0.
06
−0
.0
4
1.
00
13
M
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
26
.0
78
20
.7
84
−0
.6
2
0.
25
−0
.3
3
−0
.0
7
0.
03
0.
74
0.
09
0.
46
0.
87
0.
08
−0
.1
7
0.
38
1.
00
14
Fe
at
ur
es
bu
nd
le
d
3.
33
8
6.
84
6
0.
25
0.
20
0.
12
0.
12
−0
.0
5
−0
.2
1
−0
.2
1
−0
.1
6
−0
.3
5
−0
.0
1
0.
04
−0
.1
1
−0
.3
3
1.
00
15
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
re
le
as
es
18
.4
16
16
.4
52
0.
59
0.
26
0.
02
0.
23
0.
05
0.
15
−0
.3
1
−0
.3
3
0.
06
−0
.0
9
0.
10
0.
08
0.
01
0.
04
1.
00
16
O
bje
cts
m
o
di
fie
d
63
.8
7
65
.0
85
0.
01
−0
.4
0
−0
.0
5
0.
04
−0
.1
5
−0
.2
4
0.
20
0.
02
−0
.2
0
−0
.1
3
0.
21
0.
01
−0
.1
2
−0
.1
4
−0
.0
6
1.
00
No
te
:C
o
rr
el
at
io
ns
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
0.
16
a
re
si
gn
ific
an
ta
t
5%
o
r
le
ss
.
Copyright  2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 33: 137–161 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Does Complexity Deter Customer-Focus? 151
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
Low complexity High complexity
0 500 1000 0 500 1000
95% CI Fitted values
Estimated completion time
Ac
tu
al
 c
om
pl
et
io
n 
tim
e
Figure 2. Graphing actual project completion time on
estimated time by nature of change
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
In
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e 
(# 
of 
cla
ss
es
)
0 10 20 30
Version number
Figure 3. Plot of interdependence over product versions
we do track interdependence over time. Figure 3
plots the level of interdependence over the 28 ver-
sions of the software for which we have data. We
see from Figure 3 that interdependence grows lin-
early as the product ages. This again constitutes
evidence consistent with our theory.
Table 3 presents the results of the bivariate
probit estimation. Column (1) presents the DDI
model predicting the likelihood of fulfilling a cus-
tomer request for a feature. Of the three variables
that reflect the DDI model, only customer impor-
tance was marginally significant (p< = 0.10). The
importance of the feature to the installed base and
its estimated cost had no significant effect on the
likelihood of fulfilling the customer request. Thus,
there appears to be little empirical support for the
DDI hypothesis, Hypothesis 1. The controls for
alternative explanations were all significant and in
the expected direction.
Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the
complexity model predicting the likelihood of ful-
filling a customer request for a feature. The differ-
ence between the two specifications is the inclusion
of interdependencies in the Column (3) model. In
Column (2), both complexity measures are nega-
tive and significant, as predicted. Increases in prod-
uct age reduce the likelihood of fulfilling a cus-
tomer request, providing support for Hypothesis
2a. In addition, as the nature of change spans multi-
ple modules, the likelihood of fulfilling the request
declines, providing support for Hypothesis 2b.
The specification in Column (3) includes inter-
dependencies. The coefficient on interdependen-
cies is negative and highly significant, suggesting
that increasing product interdependencies is neg-
atively related to the likelihood of investing in
innovation. This provides additional support for
Hypothesis 2a. Whereas all the other variables con-
tinue to remain unchanged from the specification
in Column (2), product age becomes nonsignifi-
cant in Column (3) when product interdependence
is included in the specification. Product age proxies
many organizational pathologies, including inertia.
Remarkably, interdependence swamps the effects
of age. We explored the possibility that complex-
ity mediates the relationship between age and the
likelihood of investing in innovation. The causal
test for mediation outlined in Baron and Kenny
(1986) was completely met, that is, (1) product age
is statistically significant in the absence of interde-
pendencies; (2) regression of interdependencies on
product age yielded a statistically significant coef-
ficient (7.492; p<0.000); (3) interdependencies is
statistically significant; and, (4) product age turns
nonsignificant. In addition, following the proce-
dures outlined in MacKinnon et al. (2002), we per-
formed a series of product of coefficient tests for
mediation and found that the difference was highly
significant in all cases (z=>10.07; p<0.000). This
suggests that complexity is perhaps the reason for
inertia.
Model (4) estimates the DDI and complex-
ity models together. The DDI variables are all
nonsignificant. The complexity variables—inter-
dependencies and nature of change—continue to
be negative and significant. The sign and signif-
icance of the other controls are similar to those
in Model (3). The mediation effect continues to be
robust. In terms of the marginal effects, at the mean
level of interdependence, the probability of fulfill-
ing a request decreased by 0.19. For one standard
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Table 3. Bivariate probit estimates
Hyp.
sign
(1)
Fulfilled
(2)
Fulfilled
(3)
Fulfilled
(4)
Fulfilled
(5)
Standardized
Product complexity
Interdependencies (H2a) − −0.013∗ −0.014∗ −0.021∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Product age (H2a) − −0.098∗ 0.034 0.048 0.251∗
(0.049) (0.069) (0.082) (0.103)
Change complexity
Nature of change (H2b) − −2.103∗∗ −2.270∗∗ −2.180∗∗ 3.507∗∗
(0.342) (0.400) (0.259) (0.917)
Objects modified (H2b) − −0.027∗∗
(0.007)
Intermediate releases (H2b) − −0.023
(0.024)
Market incentives
Installed-base value (H1) + 0.017 0.012 0.060∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Customer importance (H1) + 0.455+ 0.343 −0.055
(0.276) (0.227) (0.315)
Estimated cost (H1) − −0.000 −0.000 −0.009∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Other controls
Market share −0.045∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.061∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.058)
Competition 0.329 0.935∗ 1.056∗ 0.844∗ 1.228∗∗
(0.338) (0.344) (0.342) (0.328) (0.459)
Standard violation −1.15∗∗ −1.138∗ −0.906∗ −0.809∗
(0.429) (0.601) (0.410) (0.367)
Version conflict 0.056 −0.056 −0.315 −0.381 −3.400∗∗
(0.386) (0.497) (0.487) (0.477) (0.984)
Time constraint −0.002∗ −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Features bundled 0.494∗∗
(0.135)
Mills ratio 8.614∗∗
(2.645)
Constant 0.896 3.028∗∗ 2.216∗ 0.931 4.461∗∗
(0.640) (0.781) (0.725) (0.678) (1.638)
Observations 152 152 152 152 120
Wald chi2 85.16∗∗ 121.36∗∗ 105.23∗∗ 308.80∗∗ 196.61∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.592 0.638 0.655 0.699 0.810
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ significant at 10%; ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
deviation above the mean level of interdependence,
the probability of fulfilling a request decreased
by 0.27. The probability of fulfilling a customer
request for a complex change was about 0.17 lower
than that for less complex changes. This provides
strong support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Hypoth-
esis 1 was uniformly unsupported.
Finally, Model (5) presents the estimates of the
likelihood of standardizing a customer request
into future versions of the software. Because
the likelihood of standardizing (or customizing)
a customer request is conditional on the like-
lihood of fulfilling a request, we condition the
estimation of this equation on the likelihood of
fulfilling a request. We identified this equation
using three variables not included in the fulfillment
equation: objects modified, intermediate releases,
and features bundled. The Mills ratio is positive
and significant, suggesting that the standardization
decision is indeed conditional on the fulfillment
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decision.4 In contrast to the results in Model (4),
the DDI variables are significant in explaining the
decision to standardize a request. At the mean
value of a feature to the installed base, the like-
lihood of standardizing a request increases by
0.0045. However, the importance that a customer
attaches to a request is not a significant predic-
tor of the decision to standardize or customize
the request. At mean levels of estimated cost
for implementing a request, the likelihood that a
request will be customized decreases by 0.0035.
This is consistent with our expectations. With the
importance to the installed base held constant, a
feature is more likely to be customized if the added
cost of standardizing cannot be recovered from the
installed base. This is because price is uniform for
the standardized version of the software but cus-
tomization generates additional revenue from the
customer that requested the feature. Thus, if the
expected increase in unit revenue from the new
feature times the installed base is less than the cost
of implementing the feature, the firm chooses to
customize rather than standardize. This is strongly
supportive of the DDI argument.
We included five complexity measures in Model
(5). We dropped standard violation from the
equation because it perfectly predicts customiza-
tion. Both product-complexity measures and two
of the three change-complexity measures were sta-
tistically significant in explaining standardization.
At mean levels of interdependence, the proba-
bility of standardization of the customer request
decreases by 0.005. At mean levels of product
age, the probability of standardization increased
by 0.0004. For complex projects, the likelihood
of standardization increases by 0.0054. Finally, at
mean levels of objects modified, the probability of
standardization decreases by 0.0027.
Prima facie, the contrasting results for two of
the complexity variables (product age and nature
of change) seem at odds with our expectations. In
fact, the effect of increasing complexity is reflected
in version conflict and the number of objects mod-
ified, both of which increase the likelihood of
customization. These two variables held constant,
major changes and an increase in product age
increase the likelihood of standardization. Upon
4 We also tested for normality of the probit selection equation.
The quantile plot of the predicted probit scores against the
normal distribution was linear as expected.
talking with the development engineers, we under-
stood that as the change spans multiple modules,
it is more efficient to implement the change in the
primary code base than to maintain distinct code
sets corresponding to different customer requests.
Finally, the sign and significance of the other con-
trols were as expected.
In summary, the large sample empirical analy-
ses suggest that in the case of software products,
complexity is indeed an important driver of the
decision to invest resources in incremental inno-
vation. We find that whereas customer demand
is an important predictor of the decision to stan-
dardize a customer request, it has little predictive
power in the decision to fulfill a request. The
important unanswered question at the conclusion
of the empirical analyses is what accounts for
the observed results. What kinds of managerial
and/or organizational decision processes explain
these empirical patterns? The qualitative study in
the following section examines this question.
SMALL SAMPLE QUALITATIVE STUDY
Sample and data
The qualitative component of the study involved
the heads of product development, product man-
agement, and marketing, and also some program-
mers and sales staff. We interviewed a total of six
persons in five rounds over a four-month period.
The interviews were semi-structured, lasted 30 to
45 minutes each, and were recorded. The first
round of interviews was open-ended and focused
broadly on the responsibilities of the individuals,
what kinds of work they perform, how their goals
are set, what kinds of projects they pursue, and
so on. Once this round of interviews was com-
pleted, we transcribed the audio recordings and
analyzed the transcripts in an effort to understand
the pattern observed in the large sample empirical
analyses. While we obtained some answers, this
review often raised other questions, prompting a
new round of interviews with the same individu-
als. We systematically narrowed our focus in each
round and terminated the interviews in the fifth
round when we saw that most of our questions had
been answered and that no new information was
being revealed. Interview transcripts covered 40
typed, single-spaced pages, which form the basis
for our analyses and inference.
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The main focus of our qualitative study was
to understand the innovation decision-making pro-
cess and how it might account for the observed
results. Starting from the decision-making pro-
cess, our probes radiated across other linked and
related issues that emerged. We began by identify-
ing the groups responsible for the fulfillment and
standardization decisions. We found that the prod-
uct management group administered the manage-
ment process for customer feature requests in close
consultation with the product development group.
Once the product development group agreed to ful-
fill a customer request, the product management
group involved the marketing group in deciding if
the request would be met with standardization or
customization. The separation of decision respon-
sibilities between product development and mar-
keting provides a baseline intuition for why the
product development group might be focused on
complexity or technical characteristics of the prod-
uct and the marketing group on the profitability of
the product. However, this intuition may be rooted
in a variety of underlying causes. Our interviews
focused on uncovering potential causes and how
they fit together to produce the empirical pattern
that showed up in our large sample analyses.
Qualitative study results
The R&D budget allocation in Measuretronics
happened in a top-down fashion. The technical
board of the company decided on priority areas for
research and provided financial resources and spe-
cific investment instructions to the division heads.
This practice is somewhat in contrast to what
Noda and Bower (1996) found in their study of
investment decisions at Bellsouth, where the top
management showed low interest in technological
decisions. The decision to invest in Bluetooth also
emanated from the board and, as this quote from
the division head indicates, allowed the R&D team
to dominate the process:
With the BPA (Bluetooth protocol analyzer),
when we started there was no market; even
the initial Bluetooth standards document was
not released. Many of the conferences and
workshops were attended by only techni-
cal staff. Bluetooth as a technology was not
proven. It was not clear whether it was com-
petition to the existing IEEE [Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers] wire-
less LAN standards. Nobody knew what mar-
ket segments will adopt this technology. Our
initiative to invest in the wireless proto-
col analyzer with a focus on Bluetooth was
driven by the board’s vision to enter the wire-
less testing segment.
Having received the board’s directive, Mea-
suretronics decided to enter this technology seg-
ment through an acquisition. At the time of the
acquisition, the firm was focused more on the tech-
nology and less on customer needs. Focusing on
a product’s technical characteristics is not unusual
in the early stages of development. Research in
the glass, cement, and minicomputers industries
documents a similar technical focus in the early
stages of a technology (Anderson and Tushman,
1990). In the case of the Bluetooth industry, the
Bluetooth standard was close to being adopted as
Measuretronics made its acquisition, increasing the
pressure on the firm to release a product into the
market quickly.
The division head continued:
We did not have a short-range wireless test-
ing product line at that time. The initial con-
ceptual design of the product was purchased
from Digicon (name disguised). We do not
know if Digicon did any marketing invest-
ment to come up with the design. But I think
the initial planning process was more focused
on engineering viability. By the time we had
got the conceptual design, the initial Blue-
tooth standard document was in final stages
and Microsoft was planning the next release
of its IDE platform.
So our immediate focus was on getting
the design to meet the Microsoft standards
and Bluetooth standards. The engineering
division took control from the start. They
designed the initial specifications for the
migration from Digicon to Measuretronics
standards. The marketing guys had mini-
mal role to play as much of the work was
designed around compliance with standards.
Because the Bluetooth project was mandated by
top management, and because of market uncer-
tainty around the desired features, the firm’s R&D
team was placed at the helm of the development
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effort. The R&D team tended to draw its informa-
tion from technical conferences and standards body
meetings, which shaped its agenda around features.
Ultimately, the product’s initial design had limited
functionality, as recognized by the head of product
development:
Eventually we released the first bare min-
imum version of the BPA. At that time
our product was priced four times more
than the nearest competitor, with fewer fea-
tures. Many of our competitors were smaller
players. The Measuretronics brand propelled
us to a few good sales. But eventually
customers started to complain. Unfulfilled
requests started to pile up and costs had to
go down. Engineering was given the goal to
reduce costs, improve stability and focus on
viability—things like, can we do this feature
in software simulation rather than hardware
simulation.
It was against this backdrop of an initial prod-
uct release that the company began receiving fea-
ture requests from customers. Similar patterns of
early product launches complemented by rapid
customer-induced innovations have been docu-
mented in open source software (Lakhani and von
Hippel, 2003). While fulfilling customer feature
requests fell in the voluntary changes category,
there were involuntary changes triggered by stan-
dards bodies that the company had to meet as well.
Product development labor had to be allocated
between the voluntary changes and the involuntary
changes. They managed this trade-off by first pri-
oritizing involuntary changes mandated by Blue-
tooth standard changes and competition releases,
as explained by the program manager:
Implementing all the feature requests is not
possible. As I said before, the BPA prod-
uct spans multiple industry segments. So
we received diverse and contrasting fea-
ture requests. We had a team of only seven
core design engineers who could individu-
ally build the features. Implementing the fea-
tures require[s] a deep understanding of the
emerging standards and norms that cannot
be readily imparted through training. In fact
there was no readymade material available
for training. So we had to filter the feature
requests.
The engineering team reviewed the requests
to check for hardware feasibility, compatibil-
ity with standards and [that they] be imple-
mentable using Microsoft VC++. For each
feature we also check if installed-base ver-
sions will be affected. For each selected
feature we do the COCOMO [constructive
cost model] estimation and give a time esti-
mate. Release timings are usually fixed based
on Bluetooth conferences and competition
releases. Since we know the approximate
dates for these events, we prepare the pre-
liminary functional specifications for the next
release candidate.
Customer feature requests that were complex
to fulfill (i.e., those that spanned multiple mod-
ules) also demanded high labor input. The product
development managers faced a problem of allo-
cating a fixed supply of development engineers
among alternative projects. The range of projects
fell broadly into two categories described earlier:
voluntary changes in software, that is, meeting
customer requests; and involuntary changes in soft-
ware, that is, changes mandated by changes in
hardware, new standards, or changes in firmware.
From their articulation of priorities, it was clear
that involuntary changes took priority over volun-
tary ones because being slow to complete involun-
tary changes jeopardizes the entire installed base.
Thus, involuntary changes were linked to survival
in the face of competitive pressures and received
priority in allocation of R&D engineers (Aghion
et al., 2001). The remaining capacity was allocated
to feature requests from customers. That said, the
allocation process of development engineers within
the firm does not sufficiently explain why prof-
itability considerations appear systematically less
relevant. Our interviews with the head of prod-
uct development suggested that the firm could not
feasibly hire and train development engineers in
response to excess demand because the techni-
cal labor market does not seamlessly adjust to
short-run ebbs and flows in demand. In addition,
top-down resource allocation and goal-setting pro-
cesses made it difficult for subunits to engage in
anticipatory hiring.
We always try to distribute our experienced
personnel over different programs. Outside
hiring is limited to entry level program-
mers or people with specific skills like C#
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or embedded programming. We wanted to
hire about 10 engineers this year and it has
been hard for us. We find lots of appli-
cation programmers but we need electrical
engineers with good hardware and software
design skills. Out of the 10 positions, we
have managed to fill only two positions in a
six-month window. And out of the two new
hires, one has already left because we could
not promise any onsite opportunity for him.
So it is very difficult to hire new personnel
for our programs. Because of product line
organizing it is difficult to have a big bench
size by mass hiring. We do not know for sure
if projects will be allocated in the future and
having a big bench size without an adequate
project pipeline is expensive.
While training and a shortage of skilled labor
appear to be important constraints on the fulfill-
ment of customer requests, it is likely a spuri-
ous reason. Even if the firm was able to rapidly
hire and fire technical personnel in response to
spikes in customer requests, it is unlikely that
complex requests would be fulfilled. As noted ear-
lier, the prior literature on software maintenance
highlights the challenges of learning in the pres-
ence of turnover. Our interviews with the develop-
ment engineers provided some insight into the pri-
macy of complexity issues. The engineers placed
a strong emphasis on minimizing disruptions in
other parts of the organization. For instance, design
changes that might necessitate hardware changes
were rarely even discussed. The division of labor
within the organization discouraged such changes.
For enhancement programs (i.e., customer
requests for features), we usually check if
the base reference architecture needs a major
revamp with respect to any emerging tech-
nologies or new standards. Until pushed to
the limit, we tend not to change the core
architecture. We want the core architecture
to be stable so that we can focus more on
the applications that deliver functionality.
The reference architecture is the backbone
of a product. It should not only facilitate the
things marketing and engineering are asking
for in the current release but should sup-
port future requirements without big changes.
Architectural changes are difficult because
we will have to redesign all the software
interfaces and change the hardware layout,
which has ripple effects on assembly and
manufacturing. So keeping the architecture
stable is a high priority.
While the quote above explains why complex-
ity considerations might dominate fulfillment deci-
sions, it says little about why customer demand
or profitability is systematically uncorrelated with
this decision. Our interviews suggested that the
organization structure and budgeting process of
product development, as well as the incentive sys-
tem rewarding the engineers, partly explained why
customer demand was uncorrelated with customer
request fulfillment (Bower, 1970). The R&D activ-
ity in the firm is broken down progressively and
assigned to program committees that are respon-
sible for specific modules. These program com-
mittees enjoy significant autonomy over decisions
that affect only their module. They are discour-
aged from pursuing changes that cross boundaries
into other program committees. The gain from
a proposed change has to be substantial before
it is advanced for discussion across the program
committees.
At the board level, R&D budgets are either
allocated to the instruments business or com-
munications business. Inside each of these
businesses there are several product lines and
the budget for each product line is allocated
by the general manager of the business line in
consultation with the vice presidents for each
product line. At the product line level, we
form several program committees that decide
on and pursue specific projects each year.
Typically, a program committee consists of
the product line technical head, key prod-
uct engineers, and marketing members. It is
headed by a program manager with strong
product development experience.
The link to profitability was largely muted
because product development occurred mostly at
the program level, where choices about develop-
ment were only remotely connected to product
success. The choices of product development engi-
neers were driven by two important criteria linked
to their incentives: on-time completion of tasks
and multitasking. The first criterion resulted in
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the engineers avoiding complex projects. Com-
plex projects usually involved multiple modules,
and coordinating changes across modules usually
involved interfacing with other program teams.
Because this introduced an additional element
of uncertainty and affected the time required to
complete a task, program teams tended to avoid
fulfilling customer requests that spanned multi-
ple modules. In addition, measuring multitasking
created a perverse incentive among the develop-
ment engineers (Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Specifically, it biased them toward fulfilling more
requests rather than less, subject to the sole con-
straint of available engineering man-hours. In other
words, the product development group chose to
pursue two projects that would demand 100 man-
hours rather than a single project that would take
the same 100 man-hours—even if the latter was
more profitable. We found that the annual perfor-
mance appraisal of the product development engi-
neers was heavily weighted toward the number of
projects (identified by a unique ticket number) they
worked on during the year. This would naturally
give the product development group incentive to
maximize the number of projects pursued.
Product success is determined by the mar-
ket share we have captured and profitability.
But program success is different from prod-
uct success. A product success (or failure)
may be a function of several programs. So we
cannot fully determine the success of a pro-
gram based on product success or failure. At
the program level, we evaluate engineering
team members’ contribution to the product
features in terms of design ideas, minimiz-
ing build errors, on-time completion of tasks,
and multitasking.
The analyses of the interview data suggests that
the organization structure guiding the allocation of
resources and the choice of projects, the primacy of
product development engineers in the development
process, their preoccupation with architectural sta-
bility, and their incentive structure, accounted for
why profitability concerns were muted in the ful-
fillment decision. However, this does not explain
why profitability became salient in the customiza-
tion or standardization decision. Our interviews
revealed a straightforward explanation (also related
to the organization structure and incentives) for
this, as recounted by the marketing manager:
Engineering had to fulfill the numerous
unfulfilled customer feature requests. They
had a process to sort them into functional
specs for releases—finding the viability of
requests, to see if there are standards con-
flicts and so on. Once the engineering team
decides on the viability and cost estimation,
we decide on the fulfillment priority and
mode of fulfillment based on market timing
and profit considerations. We usually work
closely with the development team to gen-
erate project effort estimates and sales and
accounting to work on pricing and providing
a scheduling estimate to the customer. If the
customer agrees to the pricing and scheduling
estimate, then we work with the legal team
to develop a contract and an SLA [service
level agreement].
The marketing personnel are compensated
based on product profits, forecasting accu-
racy, success of outbound marketing cam-
paign, and customer satisfaction. We are con-
stantly working closely with our customers
and the accounting department to ensure that
we are focused on profits.
In sum, the qualitative study identified three
underlying elements of the organizational decision-
making process that might prevent the DDI model
from explaining investment in incremental inno-
vation. First, organization structure drives the
resource allocation process (Bower, 1970). In the
case of Measuretronics, the allocation process
was top-down rather than customer driven. The
board tended to track technological developments
rather than customers because the business of
test and measurement often involved the develop-
ment of products for which there was no estab-
lished (or only nascent) customer needs. Thus,
a customer-focus was historically less important
among the product development engineers. Fur-
ther, the actual development work was accom-
plished within autonomous program teams, which
fragmented their attention and predisposed them
to avoid taking on projects that would involve
coordination across program teams. Thus, complex
projects that spanned multiple modules were often
avoided. Second, the engineering team had little
control over the timing and choice of involuntary
changes in the product. Because survival depended
on rapid compliance with new and/or evolving
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standards, their development priorities were often
dictated by developments in technical committees,
such as IEEE, over which Measuretronics had no
control. Thus, competitive pressures shifted the
focus from customer requests to meeting and track-
ing technical changes in standards. In other words,
survival dominated profitability in the decision-
making process (Schaffer, 1989). Finally, we found
that the incentives provided to the development
personnel skewed their focus to maximize multi-
tasking (i.e., taking on more projects) and fulfilling
multiple requests regardless of how profitable they
were (Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The same
incentive structure explains why marketing person-
nel were more focused on profits in their decision
to pursue customization or standardization.
DISCUSSION
Despite widespread agreement in both the schol-
arly and managerial literatures on the value and
importance of prioritizing customers, achieving a
customer-focused firm appears to be an elusive
goal. In studying this puzzle, we examined whether
firm decisions to allocate resources for incremen-
tal innovation primarily reflect customer demand
or organizational constraints such as complexity.
Our empirical analysis reveals interesting patterns.
Whereas organizational considerations appear to
drive the decision about whether or not to allo-
cate resources, customer demand appears to have
an impact on how firms implemented an invest-
ment. Having concluded the study, we believe the
following four implications are important.
First, it is clear from our study that the chal-
lenges of being customer-focused emanate from
the competing trade-offs of being technologically
focused or working within organizational con-
straints. While the challenges of managing
interdependent objectives are undeniable, being
customer-focused is far from trivial or self-evident.
Prioritizing customers is a choice like any other
choice within organizations, and customer-focus
is not equally valuable to all firms. Simply judg-
ing firms on the criterion of being customer-
focused does a poor job of recognizing the myriad
objectives that organizations pursue. The complex-
ity involved in making decisions, in particular,
inevitably advances some objectives while under-
mining others. In other words, the calculus of
prioritizing customers is precisely that—a calcu-
lus—rather than a universal ideal that must always
be pursued.
Second, the qualitative study revealed that ful-
fillment decisions were dependent upon the firm’s
resource allocation and decision-making processes.
Arguably, firms (as opposed to the market) are a
response to complexity in dealing with multiple
objectives, such as staying abreast of technolog-
ical change, meeting customer needs, generating
shareholder value, keeping up with the competi-
tion, or lowering costs (Kogut and Zander, 1996).
Because a firm cannot meet all of its objectives
simultaneously, trade-offs are inevitable (Ethiraj
and Levinthal, 2009). Consequently, firm organi-
zation structures may be seen as unique responses
to the trade-offs among competing firm objectives
(Chandler, 1962).
In the case of Measuretronics, the decision-
making process was top-down and accorded pri-
macy to the firm’s technological environment.
Top management believed the firm’s mandate
was to remain at the forefront of technological
development, where customer needs had yet to
arise. In industries experiencing rapid technolog-
ical change, or in the case of new products where
customer needs are ill-formed, paying close atten-
tion to customer requests may actually increase
the competitive risk for firms. Under such circum-
stances, paying closer attention to competitors than
to customers may enhance firm survival. In fact,
depending on the particular environment and the
kind of decision being made, customers, competi-
tors, suppliers, employees, or regulatory entities
may all become important levers guiding inno-
vation decisions. As with radical innovation and
architectural innovation, the primacy of customer-
focus in incremental innovation decisions cannot
be presumed.
Third, before we jump to the inference that our
study exposes a flaw in the design of Measuretron-
ics, we need to recognize that design solutions to
complexity are only imperfect (Baldwin and Clark,
2000). Organizations may choose to artificially
limit the zone of operation of each microunit for
one of two reasons. Often the full cost of accom-
plishing a given task cannot easily be estimated,
such as when there are interdependencies between
elements of a system (Thaler, 2000). For instance,
the full cost of adopting fuel-cell technology in
cars is largely unknown since the fuel-cell engine
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shares interdependencies with refueling, distribu-
tion, and the adaptation of existing safety fea-
tures (National Academy of Sciences, 2004). When
the full cost of doing something cannot be accu-
rately estimated, encouraging cross-unit commu-
nication to pursue complex innovation is unlikely
to solve the problem. Significant interdependencies
preclude the accurate estimation of total costs and
benefits of an innovation. Because an economic
basis for a go or no-go decision is difficult to
achieve in any case, an arbitrary design rule—in
this case, that a program team should confine itself
to tightly bounded changes—appears reasonable.
Fourth, if interdependencies make it difficult to
estimate the cost of managerial action, allowing
unbounded innovation exposes an organization to
severe bargaining problems. A key question is
whether bargaining is an efficient mechanism for
conflict resolution (Cyert and March, 1963). Ask-
ing managers to bargain continually to determine
if an innovation should be pursued will debilitate
action and freeze organizations around the status
quo (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009). Under this cir-
cumstance, the organization structure and the divi-
sion of responsibility provides a mechanism for
the quasi-resolution of conflict and enables positive
managerial action, though it appears globally inef-
ficient. Perhaps the contradiction appears smaller
if we believe that activities move from the mar-
ket to the firm only when complexity precludes
global efficiencies in the first place. Complexity,
by definition, precludes the identification of opti-
mal decisions and raises the importance of behav-
ioral processes in decision making (Rivkin, 2000).
Thus, the important research question here is how
organizations should choose among multiple paths
in innovation decisions, each of which presents
attendant costs and benefits. Admittedly, we have
only scratched the surface of this phenomenon.
Much work remains before we can explain how
organizations make innovation decisions in the
face of complexity.
Finally, an important managerial implication
arises from the effect of various organizational fac-
tors on innovation decisions. Organizations might
prioritize one or more goals such as customer-
focus or cost minimization. Implementing those
goals, however, might be complicated by orga-
nizational considerations. Our data suggest that
organizational policies for resource allocation and
incentive systems often produce their own side
effects, which may not align with organizational
goals. While decision making can reflect unitary
goals and a clear cost-benefit calculus in theory, in
practice their implementation is undeniably linked
with other organizational processes. Understanding
the behavioral underpinnings of resource allocation
decisions requires us to pay particular attention to
organizational processes, which may filter infor-
mation or alter how a decision is implemented.
This study has several limitations. First, it is
based on a single industry with its own peculiar
characteristics. It is not clear to what extent the
substantive results of this paper are generalizable
across industries. For instance, measuring com-
plexity itself may be difficult in industries beyond
software, limiting the study’s external validity. Our
study is also based on data from a single firm. Ide-
ally, we would have included data from several
firms, but accessing data this detailed is extremely
difficult. In our case, it involved several years of
data collection, ongoing negotiations with the sub-
ject firm, and signing nondisclosure agreements.
This study also required detailed documentation
of the process used to handle customer requests,
which may be unique; many firms we contacted do
not collect similar data. We believe that providing a
detailed look at the decision-making process within
one firm, in addition to a large sample empirical
analysis, offers important insights about how com-
plexity interacts with organizational characteristics
to impact innovation activity.
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